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I. INTRODUCTION

During the past twenty-five years, the fields of molecular genetics,
cellular biology, and biochemistry have grown at an exponential rate due
to new innovations and discoveries.' Many of these innovations have been
genetic research tools. The term "research tool" is amorphous, and the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP), a manual used to examine and determine

* Mr. Smith graduated from Pfeiffer University in 2001 with a B.S. in Biology and
subsequently received an M.S. in Biological Sciences with an emphasis on Molecular Genetics
from the University of South Carolina in 2003. He currently attends the University of Florida,
Levin College of Law, and anticipates graduating in December 2007. Mr. Smith would like to
thank Professor Richard S. Vermut for his guidance while working on this manuscript, and
would further like to thank his partner, Angelica Saavedra, for her patience during the
composition of this manuscript.
1. See generally Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology PatentLaw: Perspectiveof the First
Seventeen Years, Prospective on the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENV. U.L. REv. 127, 135-140
(1991).
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the patentability of new inventions by the USPTO, has not defined this
term. 2 While the MPEP has not formally defined this term, new research
tools such as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and new genetic
material such as expressed sequence tags (ESTs), micro RNAs, si RNAs,
and the coding sequence for green fluorescent protein (GFP), have been
patented and utilized by the scientific community as viable research tools
in their respective fields.' The scientific community has recognized that
some genetic material, such as ESTs and GFP, have dual functions and can
be used as research tools to make further novel discoveries in the fields of
molecular genetics, cell biology, and biochemistry.4
As these scientific fields have progressed, licensing and patent laws
have adapted to allow for the patentability of these research tools.'
However, as stated above, the MPEP has refused to concisely define the
term "research tool." Regardless, section 2107 of the MPEP states "[m]any
research tools such as gas chromatographs, screening assays, and
nucleotide sequencing techniques have a clear, specific and unquestionable
utility...., 6 While the language of MPEP section 2107 indicates that any
nucleotide sequence such as any EST should be patentable, this
assumption is not true according to current patent law.7
While genetic research tools with an undisclosed function are not
initially patentable, research tools are nevertheless vital for the progression
of biotechnology. By allowing scientists to license this type of material,
scientific progression is accelerated in the area of biotechnology.
However, a poorly drafted license may be subjected to the on-sale bar of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) scrutiny, thus barring patentability if an invention is
deemed to be on-sale in this country for more than one year prior to the
filing of a patent application.8 Therefore, competing interests between the
freedom of licensing and preservation of patentability versus the 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) on-sale bar exists in the current law. This Note addresses the
following question: Can a licensing agreement be drafted to preserve

2. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
§ 2107.01 (8th ed. 2001, rev. 2, May 2004).
3. See generally Greenlee, supra note 1, at 128-38.

PROCEDURE

4. GEOFFREY L. ZUBAY, BIOcHEMIsmY 791 (4th ed. 1998).

5. See generally Lawrence T. Kass & Michael N. Nitabach, A RoadmapForBiotechnology
Patents?FederalCircuitPrecedentand the PTO 'SNew Examination Guidelines, 30 AIPLA Q.J.
233, 256-62 (2002).
6. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, § 2107.
7. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).
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patentability of unknown genetic material before its specific use has been
discovered?
To answer this question, the current utility standard set forth in 35
U.S.C. § 101 must be addressed. This standard does not allow patenting of
genetic material without a defined specific use.9 To satisfy the specific
utility requirement, a specific gene, promoter, or other use must be
identified. Therefore, the genetic material mentioned above is not initially
patentable because of 35 U.S.C. § 101 constraints.
Next, case law dealing with ambiguously drafted licensing agreements
and 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) govern court decisions regarding this particular
issue.' This Note seeks to analyze current case law and to define the term
commercial sale, and to distinguish a commercial sale from a license.
However, inspection of the current case law provides little help in
distinguishing a commercial sale from a license. Due to this discrepancy,
this genetic material may be deemed on-sale and ultimately not patentable
according to current patent law standards. Since this uncertainty exists
betweeen patent law and licensing, inventors will hesitate to license their
material before filing a patent application. This reluctance to license their
material will stymie "the [p]rogress of [s]cience and [the] useful
[a]rts"-the very reason the U.S. patent system was founded."
Finally, to clarify this current ambiguity between licensing agreements
and the on-sale bar, rules differentiating commercial sales and licenses
have been proposed. Furthermore, these proposed rules allow for
preservation of patentability if a licensing agreement is reached prior to the
critical date set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) and no patent misuse is found.
II. PATENTABILITY OF GENETIC RESEARCH TOOLS

PURSUANT TO 35 U.S.C. § 101
Before addressing 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and licensing agreements, one
must understand why this genetic material is not initially patentable. For
that, an evolutionary analysis of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 utility requirement is
necessary.' 2 35 U.S.C. § 101 was drafted to allow patents for "any new
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... ," and

9. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529, 534-35 (1966).
10. See generally Kock v. Quaker Oats Co., 681 F.2d 649, 656-58 (9th Cir. 1982); see also
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
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this new process, machine, manufacture, or composition must be more
than "a mere curiosity, a scientific process exciting wonder yet not
producing physical results... not aiding in the progress nor increasing the
possession of the human race."13 According to these statements, an
invention is not useful if it fails to perform the function it specifies.
Applying 35 U.S.C. § 101, the U.S. Supreme Court in Brenner v.
Manson addressed whether utility existed for an untested chemical
homologue. 4 A chemical homologue is derived from the same genus of
chemical groups and has a similar but not identical chemical
composition.15 In Brenner v. Manson, the appellee filed a patent claim for
a chemical compound that was a homologue of previously known tumor
inhibitor.16 However, the patent examiner denied the application, and the
U.S. Patent Office's Board of Appeals affirmed the patent examiner's
decision that chemical homologues failed to disclose any utility. 7 The
Board of Appeals reasoned that no utility existed because no testing had
been conducted on this particular chemical." Furthermore, the U.S. Patent
Office's Board of Appeals stated that a compound is not useful simply
because it is closely related to another compound.' 9 The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the Board's decision reasoning that
utility does not need to be shown so long as the product is not detrimental
to the public interest.2"
The U.S. Supreme Court, by writ of certiorari,reviewed the CCPA's
decision.21 The Court noted that the CCPA had diverged from the standard

13. ROBERT MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

141 (3d ed. 2003) (quoting WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAWOFPATENTS FORUSEFUL
INVENTIONS 463 (1890)).

14. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 520. Chemical homologues are compounds that are chemically
related, but the composition may vary by one carbon group. Id. at 522 n.3. Chemists who know the
structure of one chemical are typically aware of the structure and function of a chemical
homologue. Id. Unlike most chemical homologue functions, steroid chemical homologue function
is typically difficult to predict. Id.
15. WEBSTER'sNEWWORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 683 (4th ed. 2002). Chemical homology
is formally defined as "designating or of a series of compounds each member ofwhich has structure
differing regularly by some increment (as a CH 2 group) from that of the adjacent members." Id.
16. Brenner,383 U.S. at 521-22.
17. Id. at 521.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 522.
20. Id.
21. Brenner,383 U.S. at 522.

THE INTERACTION OF THE 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ON-SALE BAR AND IP LICENSING

of utility applied in In Application of Brenner.22 The CCPA defined its
divergent standard of utility as a process that produces a product that is not
detrimental to the public interest.23 The Court, however, articulated that a
product must be refined and developed in which a specific benefit must
exist to meet the standard of utility.24 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
a product with unidentified uses does not meet the standard of utility
because obtaining a patent on such a product may completely bar research
in whole areas of scientific development.25 The Court concluded "a patent
is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation
for its successful conclusion."26
Immediately after Brenner, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) issued a decision that was consistent with the Court's
definition of utility. 27 In In re Kirk, the appellant had filed claims for '1-

Dehydro-6-Methyl steroid compounds which were chemical homologues
of other known and patented chemical compounds. 2' These previously
patented, chemical homologues had met the requisite utility requirement,
and the appellant argued since those previously patented homologues had
utility, these untested steroid homologues also had the requisite utility for
patentability. These claims, however, were rejected by the patent examiner
for lack of utility, and this decision was affirmed by the U.S. Patent

22. Id. at 530. At this time no uniform definition of utility existed. A conflict as to what
constituted utility existed between the Patent Office and the CCPA, and a conflict existed between
the CCPA and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. at 522 n.4.
23. Id. at 530.
24. Id. at 535. The standard applied in In Applicationof Bremner stated that a patent could
not be granted unless a product was deemed useful. Id. at 529. In In Application of Brenner,no uses
for the claimed products were shown in specification. Id. The BrennerCourt noted that the U.S.
Patent Office had maintained this view of usefulness with fidelity while the CCPA had diverged
from this holding. Id. at 530.
25. Id. at 535.
26. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536. The Court looked to the legislative intent of 35 U.S.C. § 101
to determine how Congress defined utility or usefulness. Id. at 532. However, no specific assistance
was found. Id. In stating the specific and substantial utility requirement, patentable utility can be
established by satisfying one of two inquiries. Kass & Nitabach, supranote 5, at 259. First, the PTO
asks whether this new invention is well-known in the field or whether this invention is apparent
upon reading the application to someone in that field. Id. Second, the PTO asks "whether the
applicant has stated a 'specific and substantial utility."' Id.
27. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
28. Id. at 937-38. '1-Dehydro-6-Methyl compounds are a class of steroid compounds which
have been deemed useful. Id. Subsequently, the appellant in In re Kirk alleges that '1 -Dehydro-6Methyl compound derivatives should also be useful because their biological properties should be
apparent to those skilled in the art. Id.
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Office's Board of Appeals.29 The appellant ultimately appealed to the
CCPA.30
To further expound his argument, the appellant initially proposed
discovery of 1-dehydo steroid derivatives possessed biological activity.3'
These derivatives supposedly contained useful biological properties
apparent to those skilled in the art.32 Upon final rejection, the patent
examiner stated this product lacked utility.33 First, the patent examiner
noted that the claimed useful biological properties failed to state any
therapeutic activity whatsoever.34 Second, the patent examiner found the
appellants had not listed one specific use for their claimed steroids." In
support of the patent examiner's findings, the U.S. Patent Office's Board
of Appeals said the "reference biological properties was too general and
vague; therefore this claim was rendered meaningless."36
To rebut the presumption of lack of utility, the appellant argued that
these compounds could be used in a manner similar to other steroid
hormones in the veterinary or medical fields.37 However, the CCPA
affirmed both the patent examiner and the U.S. Patent Office's Board of
Appeals' ruling because the expressions biological activity and biological

29. Id. at 937.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 939. The Kirk court was concerned with the appellant's claims ofbiological activity
because the claimed compounds may lack both usefulness under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and disclosure
of how to use the compounds under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id.
32. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 938.
33. Id. at 939. This appeal was initially three months before the Brenner decision, but the
case was never decided. Id. at 938 n.4. Subsequently the CCPA restored the appeal and allowed
reargument in which counsel could file stating the effects of Brenner.Id. The CCPA applied the
Brennerstandard of utility in which a specific use was required to be stated. Id. at 940. The CCPA
stated, "Appellants have not listed one specific use for their claimed steroids and as those skilled
in the art know steroids are susceptible to hundreds of uses." In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 940.
34. Id. at 939. To rebut the patent examiner's assertion that no use was specified, appellants
submitted an affidavit by Dr. Petrow. Id. Petrow showed that certain steroid derivatives had been
tested in vitro as well as in vivo. Id. at 939. The in vivo tests used laboratory animals such as rats
and rabbits. ld. at 940 n.5. These tests showed oral progestational activity for claim 25, anabolic
activity for claim 26 that was higher than testosterone proprionate, and anti-inflammatory properties
possessed by claim 39. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 939-40.
35. Id. at 940.
36. Id.
37. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 941. The appellants reasoned that this disclosure stated that these
novel compounds could be used in the form of a tablet, elixir, injections, implants, or other
pharmaceutical preparations. Id.
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properties provided no indication of usefulness. 3' The CCPA found that
further experimentation would be necessary to determine the uses of these
compounds. 39 The CCPA articulated that the statutes implied a policy that
sought to prevent a guessing game.4"
While the CCPA found that these steroid derivatives lacked utility
when proposed to have biological activity, the appellant alternatively
proposed these steroid derivatives could be useful as chemical
intermediates." To support their case, appellant cited In re Nelson.42 In re
Nelson, held that new steroid compounds with an unknown biological
activity have therapeutic properties and utility because previously
patented, chemical homologues exhibited the requisite utility and
thereapeutic properties.43
The CCPA stated, however, that the Court overturned In re Nelson with
the Brenner decision.' The CCPA reasoned that the Court in Brenner
rejected arguments that intermediates were "useful as building blocks of
' Thus, the decision was affirmed, and since the
value to the researcher."45
Brenner and In re Kirk decisions,
the courts have consistently upheld the
46
Court's definition of utility.
Since the Brenner and In re Kirk decisions, the field of molecular
genetics has grown exponentially. 47 Subsequently, novel research methods

38. Id. The CCPA reasoned the terms biological activity or biological properties were
nebulous expressions. Id. Furthermore, the CCPA noted that these expressions were as "obscure
as 'useful for technical and pharmaceutical purposes' unsuccessfully relied upon by the appellant
in In re Diedrich."Id.The Diedrichcourt reasoned that no specific use was divulged. Id. at 941 n.6.
39. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 942. This court noted that pharmacological testing should
proceed and find some salutary effects related to the claimed compounds. See id. at 941 n.7.
Additionally, the results of the test should be disclosed. Id.
40. Id. at 942. This court stated that a patent could not be granted in which the claimed
compound's usefulness was so vague that more research needed to be conducted to obtain its
specific use. Id.
41. Id. at 942-43. The appellant claimed the steroid derivatives may be used in the formation
of 6-methyl aromatic steroids. Id. at 943. This court noted that the appellants did not disclose either
broadly or specifically what these intermediates may produce, and the appellants did not specify
a property known to the art at the time they filed their application. Id. at 943 n.8.
42. Id. In In re Nelson, Nelson claimed that chemical intermediates could be used to produce
steroids and that some of these steroids would have useful therapeutic properties; the CCPA granted
this application. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
43. See Inre Nelson, 254 F.3d at 180-81.
44. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 944.
45. Id. at 945.
46. Id. at 946.
47. See In Re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); seegenerallyRobert S. Schwartz,
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and techniques have been invented and improved upon thus leading to new
genetic discoveries in the field of molecular genetics.48 Using these new
or improved research methods, researchers are constantly attempting to
discover new endogenous genes, gene expression, and gene function.49
These novel research methods and research tools have consequently
presented a quandary as to what the standard of utility is when dealing
with molecular genetics. 5°
In In re Fisher,the appellant contended that the U.S. Patent Board of
Appeals applied a heightened standard for utility when trying to determine
the patentability of these specific ESTs.5 The appellant alleged this
heightened standard was "some undefined 'spectrum' of knowledge
concerning the corresponding gene function."52 However, the appellant
adopts Justice Story's view of a useful invention in which the invention
need "not be frivolous, or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good
morals of society."53 If the invention is not frivolous, or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or good morals of society, the appellant suggests
the claimed ESTs are useful according to 35 U.S.C. § 101.14 Additionally,
the appellant alleged that the commercial success of ESTs confirms the
utility of the ESTs at issue.55

Genes ForFree: The Effect ofPublicationof the Human Genome on the PatentabilityofGenes and
Gene-Based Inventions, 23 PACE L. REV. 731, 747-48 (2003). Gene based inventions must still
satisfy the specific and substantial utility requirement. Id. at 747. Compounds or genes that have
only a hypothetical usefulness or genes deemed to be a research tool will not satisfy the utility
requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 748.
48. See generallyGreenlee, supranote 1, at 135-40.
49. See generally id at 128-3 8.
50. See generally Kass & Nitabach, supra note 5, at 256-60.
51. In re Fisher,421 F.3dat 1369.
52. Id.
53. Id. For further explanation of Justice Story's views of a useful invention, see generally
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). Justice Rader distinguishes Brenner
and In re Kirk from the instant case by stating ESTs are beneficial to society because they may be
used to isolate underlying protein encoding genes. In re Fisher,421 F.3d at 1379-80 (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
54. In reFisher,421 F.3d at 1369.
55. Id. at 1370. See also Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(stating that proofof a utility may be supported when a claimed invention has commercial success).
Furthermore, it is doubtful that identification of new genes will satisfy the utility standard until its
biological functions are known; therefore, the gene will be deemed commercially impractical.
Schwartz, supra note 47, at 749.
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The Fisher court disagreed with the appellant's assertions that a
heightened standard of utility was applied. 6 The instant court applied the
specific and substantial standard of utility set forth in Brenner for a
product to be patentable." To meet the substantial utility standard, the
claim asserted must show a real world value in which the invention
significantly benefits the public. 8 Furthermore, the court noted that to
adhere to the specific utility requirement a claim must not be so unclear as
to be meaningless. 9
In addressing the appellant's seven -laims for utility, the Fishercourt
stated that the appellant admitted the claimed ESTs have no known
function.6 ° The court reasoned that the appellant asserted generic claims
which could apply to any ESTs isolated from any organism.6 Although the
appellant further contended that the five ESTs could be used to identify
promoters or polymorphisms, the instant court found that the appellant had
not shown a substantial use for the promoters or polymorphism that could
be identified by the claimed ESTs.62 Additionally, the court noted that the
ESTs described were no more than research intermediates similar to the
steroid derivatives in In re Kirk.63 Therefore, these intermediates or
research tools may be helpful in identifying useful genes, but more
research is needed to determine if these ESTs are useful.'
Before Brenner, no uniform definition of utility existed when dealing
with the chemical arts or biotechnology.65 However, the Brenner Court
articulated the current standard of utility to provide uniformity to this

56. Inre Fisher,421 F.3d at 1372.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1371. In 2001, the USPTO issued Utility Guidelines governing the determination
of utility according to 35 U.S.C. § 101 when dealing with ESTs. Id. at 1372. Although the
guidelines were not binding on the courts, an invention must have a real world use to satisfy the
utility requirement. Id. Iffurther research is needed to confirm a real world use, the utility standard
has not been met. Id.; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supranote 2, § 2107, at 210032.
60. In Re Fisher,421 F.3d at 1373.
61. Id. at 1374.
62. See id. at 1374-75.
63. Id. The instant court reasoned ESTs are mere "object[s] of use-testing," object(s) which
further scientific is needed without assurance that anything useful will be discovered. Id. (quoting
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966)).
64. Id. at 1375.
65. See generally Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529-32.
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growing dilemma.66 The current utility requirements place a heightened
standard of specific utility on genetic material.6 7 Due to the present utility
constraints, genetic material that lacks a known function is not patentable.
To find a specific use, inventors may choose to collaborate with others and
license this material to find a subsequent use. If a licensing agreement is
pursued but poorly drafted, the inventor(s) may be subjected to 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (b) scrutiny and ultimately lose patent rights to their invention(s).
I.35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ON-SALE BAR AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS

Although this genetic material is not initially patentable because it
lacks specific utility, the question remains whether a licensing agreement
may be drafted to find the use of this material while circumventing the onsale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b). The courts are currently divided on this
issue. Some courts have found that agreements similar to assignments and
licenses may trigger either the public use or on-sale bars to patentability
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).6 8 However, other courts have found that
the experimental use exception applies thus preserving patentability. 69 To
promote scientific innovation and licensing, clear standards should be set
forth distinguishing the difference between a sale and a license.
Section 102(b) provides that:
[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention was
patented or described in printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on-sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States.7"

A determination that an invention was on-sale within the meaning of
section 102(b) requires that "the claimed invention... was operable, the
complete invention claimed was embodied in or obvious in view of the

66. Id. at 534-35.
67. Id. The standard set forth is often termed the practical utility standard in which a real
world application must be divulged. Kass & Nitabach, supra note 5, at 237.
68. See Kock v. Quaker Oats, 681 F.2d 649, 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1982).
69. See Pharmacia, Inc. v. Frigitronics, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 876, 887 (D. Mass. 1989).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002).

2006]
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device offered for sale and the sale or offer was primarily for profit rather
than experimental purposes."'"
This concept was first articulated in the Patent Act of 1793 which
provided that a patent should issue for an invention "not known or used
before [the] application."72 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that these words
meant not known or used by others before the application. 73 However, the
Act of 1836 changed the patent laws to provide that "a patent should not
be issued for an invention which was, at the time of his [the inventor's]
application for a patent, in public use or on-sale with his consent and
allowance., 74 In 1952, a time period of one year was enacted to ensure that
not prior to one year the invention was not in public use or on-sale with the
consent of the inventor." This one year time limit or critical date was
adopted to prevent potential patent misuse in which an inventor would
exploit his invention commercially as a trade secret and then pursue a
patent.
Furthermore, what constitutes placing an invention 'on-sale' has been
subject of much litigation. The Court in ConsolidatedFruit-JarCo. v.
Wright, stated a single sale before the patenting of a product may be fatal
for patenting purposes.7 6 Subsequent courts have consistently followed this
rule. Furthermore, several courts have stated that a formal offer, as
defined
77
by contract law, does not need to be made for this bar to apply.
However the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that
"whether a device has been placed on-sale is not subject to a mechanical
rule., 78 "The on-sale determination depends on the totality of the
circumstances, considered in view of the policies underlying section
102(b)., 79 Furthermore,

71. Micro Chem., Inc v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc., 103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(quoting KeyStone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1451 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
72. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 11 (1829).
73. See id.
74. Lyman v. Maypole, 19 F. 735,738 (C.D.N.D. I11.1884); see also Metallizing Eng'g Co.
v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1946).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952).
76. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 94 (1876).
77. See also RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Helifix,
Ltd. v. Block-Lok, Ltd., 26 F. Supp. 2d 294, 301 (D. Mass 1998).
78. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
79. Id.
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[t]hese policies include discouraging removal of inventions from
the public domain that the public reasonably has come to believe
are freely available; encouraging the prompt and widespread
disclosure of inventions; allowing the inventor a reasonable amount
of time following sales activity to determine the potential economic
value of a patent; and prohibiting the inventor from commercially
exploiting his invention beyond the statutorily prescribed time.8"
As Judge Learned Hand stated, "it is a condition upon the inventor's right
to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is
ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy or legal
monopoly."'"
Applying these concepts to case law, in RollerBearing Co. ofAmerica
v. Bearings, an inventor of a roller bearing gave twenty bearings gratis to
use in tests via an agreement prior to the critical date.82 Although these
roller bearings were given gratis and were not placed into any equipment
destined for sale, the district court held that this transaction constituted a
sale because the inventor anticipated that favorable test results would
culminate in further transactions and possibly sales.83 Therefore, the patent
was invalid under the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).84 Stating that the
principle intent of the inventor was not merely to obtain additional test
results but to convince others of the reliability of the invention, the district
court rejected the inventor's argument that the testing was merely an
extension of the inventor's own testing program.8 ' The district court
articulated that if a use before the critical date is primarily for profit, with
experimentation only being incidental, then it comes within the prohibition
of35 U.S.C. § 102(b).86 Thus the inventor was interested in the testing, but
the inventor's activities could be characterized as sales. 7
Furthermore, in Kock v. Quaker Oats, Co., the circuit court found a
patent invalid because an agreement signed prior to the critical date

80.
81.
1946).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.
Roller Bearing Co. of Am. v. Bearings, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 703, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Id.
Id. at 707-08.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Bearings, 322 F. Supp. at 707-08.
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constituted a sale.8 8 In this case, Merry Manufacturing Company hired
Kock to invent one working prototype watch.89 Kock and the Merry
Manufacturing Company signed an agreement stating, "[t]he INVENTOR
hereby sells, assigns and transfers all rights to his novelty toy watch
movement and any invention embodied therein to the (Merry)
COMPANY." 90 The agreement further stated that improvements may be
made to the invention and submitted to the inventor.9" Other provisions of
the contract not disclosed in the case opinion discussed royalties and the
obligation of the company to secure a patent for Kock. 92
This last provision states that if the company commences
commercial production, "the COMPANY shall research patent
aspects of the watch movement and endeavor to patent all
patentable features thereof' and "diligently" and "actively pursue"
all necessary steps to obtaining a patent for Kock.9 3
Although the court found Kock's patent invalid, he argued that the transfer
of his invention was for experimental purposes.94
The Kock court noted that "not all transfers from an inventor to a third
party trigger the bar of section 102(b)." 95 If a transfer is made for
experimentation, then there is no public use or sale within the meaning of
the statute.96 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the burden
of proof for an experimental use is on the inventor to insure that abuses
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) do not arise. 97
In his affidavit, Kock stated that the prototype was transferred for
research and study.98 He did not know at the time that the prototype was
in its final form. 99 Only after considerable study and work on his part and
the research on Merry's part, that the prototype was adopted as the final
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93.
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95.
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See Kock v. Quaker Oats Co., 681 F.2d 649, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
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Id.
Kock, 681 F.2d at 652.
Id. at 651.
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Id. at 653.
Kock, 681 F.2d at 655.
Id.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[V'ol. I11

form of the toy watch that would be offered for sale to the public.' °
However, the Kock court noted "an inventor must do more than allege his
experimental goals to avoid the statutory bar."'' The Kock court further
reasoned to receive an experimental exception the inventor must
demonstrate objective evidence that further experimentation was needed
and performed by the transferee."0 2 However, this factor alone is not
enough to avoid the on-sale bar. 0 3 "To avoid the on-sale bar, the inventor
must further show that the transferee lacked authority to use the invention
or exploit its commercial value."'"
The Kock court noted that the agreement was poorly drafted.'0 5 It is
entitled "Manufacturing Agreement," and it had a provision that stated that
production of the watch is contingent on whether or not the prototype
delivered is desirable. 0 6 If desirable, then Merry must act with diligence
to obtain a patent in the inventor's name.10 7 However, no express recital of
any experimental purpose is present in the contract.10 8 There was no
indication in the agreement that Kock would direct the experiments, or
even that Merry would make reports of the tests to Kock. The contract's
mention of experiments by Merry thus does not state or clearly imply a
permissible experimental purpose.' 0 9 The Kock court further reasoned that
the primary defect in Kock's case was that no basis at all existed that
required Merry to perform further experiments."0 The agreement must be
interpreted to permit Merry to exercise complete control over commercial
use and exploitation of the invention, without any obligation to
experiment."1
Finally the Kock court concluded, an "inventor who makes an
assignment or transfer to a third party, retaining only an interest in future
royalties, has made a 'sale' under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)."' 12 This transaction
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requires a timely patent application to be filed within one year." 3 The
court further reasoned that since all the evidence shows Kock made an
assignment or sale and made no timely application, his patent is invalid." 4
The Kock and Roller Bearing courts holdings were draconian when
ruling these transactions constituted a sale. Even though neither inventor's
acts seemed egregious, the court invalidated each inventor's patents. The
ambiguous language of the Kock agreement suggests that the agreement
could be deemed a license, and the Roller Bearing scenario does not
suggest that a sale was intended. However, the courts arbitrarily decided
what may constitute a sale. Furthermore, little guidance was given in Kock
or Roller Bearing to differentiate a sale from a licensing agreement.
Without the proper judicial and statutory guidance, inventors especially in
the area of biotechnology may unknowingly subject themselves to 35
U.S.C. § 102 (b) scrutiny by licensing their genetic material.
IV. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SALE

Until this time, the Court has never formally defined commercial sale,
and arbitrary standards determined whether an agreement was a license or
sale. However, the Court attempted to clarify this ambiguity in Pfaff v.
Wells Elecs., Inc."5 The Court in Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc. held that an
inventor's acceptance of purchase order for the inventor's computer chip
socket established a sale.116 This event occurred more than one year before
the inventor filed a patent application for the socket." 7 The Court,
therefore, ruled that the patent was invalid under statutory on-sale bar,
even though the invention was not reduced to practice until after the
critical date." 8 The Court reasoned that the sale was commercial and not
experimental in nature, and the invention was ready for patenting since
drawings which the inventor sent to the purchaser before the critical date
fully disclosed invention." 9 When deciding this case, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test for determining the sale of an invention: (1) Is
the invention ready for patenting; and (2) whether the patented technology
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114.
115.
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119.

Kock, 681 F.2d at 658 n.8.
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525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998).
Id. at 68-69.
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Id. at 63.
Id. at 62-63.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY14 W& POLICY

[Vol. I11

had been commercially offered for sale. 2° Although the Court attempted
to clarify what constituted2 a sale, the court did not define the phrase
commercial offer for sale.' '
While the Court attempted to establish a test for a commercial sale, this
test created more questions than answers. The Court did not define the
phrase "commercially offered for sale." Although this second prong
probably infers that a transaction that is experimental in nature does not
equate to a commercial offer for sale, the Court did not explicitly state this
reasoning. Therefore, the amorphous phrase "commercially offered for
sale" could be used to trap licensors and render their agreements
commercial sales.
The U.S. Federal Circuit recognized the imprecision of the phrase
"commercially offered for sale" and sought to specifically address this
issue in Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.' 22 In this case, Group
One sued Hallmark for infringement of two patents directed to a machine
for producing curled and shredded ribbon for decorative packaging, and
23
directed to a method for producing the curled and shredded ribbon.
judgment that Group One's
Hallmark counterclaimed for a declaratory
24
patent was invalid and unenforceable.
In this case, the named inventor of the two disputed patents and sole
shareholder of Group One, was Frederic Goldstein. 2 5 Goldstein filed a
patent application in the United Kingdom on November 14, 1991 for an
automated ribbon curling and shredding device. 126 Subsequently, Goldstein
filed a patent application with the European Patent Office under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and designated the United States as the country
to file in.' 27 Thereafter, Goldstein filed a U.S. patent application
corresponding to the PCT application on May 13, 1994, and this
application issued a patent on May 21, 1996 and another on January 27,
1998. 128
By engaging in communications with Hallmark and other companies
before filing the PCT application, Goldstein attempted to create interest in
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See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
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his device.' 29 On June 24, 1991, he wrote to Hallmark: "We have
developed a machine which can curl and shred ribbon so that Hallmark can
produce the product you see enclosed-a bag of already curled and
shredded ribbon.... We could provide the machine and/or the technology
and work on a license/royalty basis.' 3' Hallmark expressed interest, and
continued their correspondence. ' 3'Both parties agreed to meet on February
17, 1992 to discuss details of Goldstein's invention. 32 Prior to the
meeting, the parties negotiated a Confidential Disclosure Agreement
(CDA) regarding the technology to be discussed at the meeting, but
Hallmark never signed this agreement. 33 Goldstein then had a telephone
conference with a Hallmark engineer, and the parties discussed details of
Group One's machine and method.134 At the time, Goldstein had signed the
CDA and incorrectly believed the CDA to be in effect. 135 Hallmark
cancelled the planned February 17 meeting and decided it would instead
evaluate its
own internal capability of producing a curling and shredding
36
machine.
On June 6, 1992, Hallmark sent a letter to Goldstein indicating that it
had developed a machine for curling and shredding ribbon, and they were
not interested in purchasing Group One's machine.3 3 The letter further
stated "we would like to thank you[r] firm for suggesting the curled ribbon
product to us by paying you $500.,,138 Anticipating a misappropriation
claim, Hallmark's letter stated a CDA was never signed and requested that
Goldstein sign a release on account of Hallmark's use of the curled ribbon
idea in return for the $500 payment.39 The letter, however, did not
reference the telephone conference with Hallmark's engineer or the
information gained during the conference. 4 ' Furthermore, Goldstein
declined the $500 offer and did not sign the release. 4 ' According to
Hallmark, the company temporarily abandoned the project and did not
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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again begin developing a curling and shredding machine until April
1994.142 Sometime in March or April 1995, it produced its "Curl Cascade"
product and its "Curl Fill" product. 43 The machine that makes these
products was the subject of the suit."
Group One brought a patent infringement suit, and Hallmark moved for
summary judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), on the grounds
that the patented machine and method had been "on-sale" more than one
year prior to the filing date of the application. 45 The circuit court found
the "critical date" was November 12, 1991.'" The trial court reasoned that,
even though the pre-critical date communications between Group One and
Hallmark did not constitute a formal contractual offer of sale, the
communications constituted an offer for sale in the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) onsale bar context. 47 The trial court ruled that the two patents were invalid,
and dismissed the infringement suit. 4 Although the November 12, 1991
correspondence discussed a potential exclusive licensing agreement and
the district court acknowledged that the communication did not constitute
a formal offer for sale, the circuit court stated that a commercial offer for
sale must meet the level of an offer for sale in the contract sense, one that
would be understood as an offer of sale in the commercial community.
However, the U.S. Federal Circuit disregarded the trial court's
reasoning and stated that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) would be
used to define whether a communication or series of communications rises
to the level of a commercial offer for sale. 5 ° This court previously
articulated, "' [t]he UCC has been recognized as the general law governing
the sale of goods and is another useful, though not authoritative, source in
determining the ordinary commercial meaning of terms used by the
parties."'' Furthermore, the U.S. Federal Circuit stated that the
correspondence and other interactions between Group One and Hallmark
prior to the critical date did not constitute a commercial offer to sell the
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invention.'52 However, the Group One court noted that a set of interactions
between parties will not always be easy to ascertain what constitutes a
commercial offer to sell.' Although the U.S. Federal Circuit addressed
the issue of commercial sale, the circuit court did not propose rules or
guidance for making these determinations.
While the U.S. Federal Circuit found that the on-sale bar did not apply
under these specific circumstances, the circuit court did not address
whether an offer to license raised the on-sale bar. 5 4 However, Judge
Lourie addressed this issue in his concurrence. Judge Lourie stated that the
communications from Goldstein to Hallmark about his invention
"unmistakably bore the marks of an offer to license the invention rather
than an offer to sell it."' 55 The communications did offer to "provide the
machine," but those offers were accompanied by language indicating that
it was to be provided on a "license/royalty basis."' 56 Goldstein did not
indicate that he intended to sale his machine, and no price or date of
delivery was specified.' 57 In the letter from Goldstein to Hallmark,
Goldstein stated that Group One "only offered to sell Hallmark the
machine."' 5 8 However, according to Judge Lourie, that reference to selling
does not override the frequent references to providing the machine on a
license/royalty basis."' As Judge Lourie indicated, a license of a patent is
not usually a sale of the patented product, and the statute bars a sale, not
a license. 60 A license is analogous to granting or waiving rights under the1
patent, which is distinct from selling the machine covered by the patent. 16
Judge Lourie further stated that a patent license, if it is non-exclusive, is
an agreement to forbear from suit. 62 If the license is exclusive, it may be
tantamount to an assignment of the patent. 163 In neither case is the
invention of the patent necessarily on-sale when the license is executed."64
Judge Lourie stated:
152.
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[I]f a license were equivalent to a sale for purposes of the on-sale
bar, many patents would be invalidated long before the invention
itself is put on-sale because the grant of licenses often long
precedes commercialization by sale of the invention. The law does
not start the on-sale bar
clock running when a license to an
65
invention is executed.'
Although the U.S. Federal Circuit sought to define the phrase
"commercial sale" in Group One, several problems still persist. The U.S.
Federal Circuit's decision regarding commercial sales binds only the
courts directly beneath them; however, this rule is not binding in other
federal courts or state courts for that matter. Therefore, another court could
follow a different standard when deciding what constitutes a commercial
sale.
Another flaw in the Group One court's reasoning is that the UCC has
not been uniformly adopted throughout the United States. Although
permutations of the UCC have been adopted in most states, the terms
commercial sale and offer for sale most likely vary from state to state.
Therefore, the Group One court provided little uniformity or clarity when
the UCC definitions were adopted to define the terms commercial sale and
commercial offer. Furthermore, this uncertainty once again leads to the
question of what is a commercial sale.
To provide greater certainty, a test needs to be articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court to end the debate of what constitutes a commercial sale and
what invokes the on-sale bar rule of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). If the U.S.
Supreme Court articulated a test for a commercial sale under 35 U.S.C. §
102 (b), inventors could undauntingly draft licensing agreements that
would allow them to further experiment on their inventions without the
possibility of losing the right to patent their invention. This hypothetical
test would further "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and [the] useful
[a]rts" by encouraging inventors to freely license their material before
applying for a patent."
Although the Group One court attempted to define commercial sale,
the circuit court chose not to address the issue of whether a license could
constitute an offer for sale. 167 However, in his concurrence, Judge Lourie

165. Id. (Lourie, J., concurring).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
167. Group One, 254 F.3d at 1049.

THE INTERACTION OF THE 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ON-SALE BAR AND IP LICENSING

333

addressed this issue. 6 8 Judge Lourie reasoned that Goldstein was
attempting to interest Hallmark in his invention via a license agreement
rather than an offer to sell it. The communications did offer to "provide the
machine," but those offers were accompanied by language indicating that
it was to be provided on a "license/royalty basis."' 69 Judge Lourie stated
that a license under a patent is not usually a sale of the patented product,
and the statute bars a sale, not a license. 70 To further support Judge
Lourie's reasoning, Black's Law Dictionary defines license as "[a]
revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise be
unlawful. .. "'71
While Lourie vehemently denied the idea that a license constitutes an
offer to sale, his concurrence was threadbare with case law citations
supporting this idea.' 72 Case law does state that a license should not
constitute an offer for sale; however, numerous cases have found that a
licensing agreement may constitute a sale.'73 Furthermore, Lourie's
reasoning that exclusive license agreements are comparable to assignments
and do not constitute a sale may be incorrect. To support this notion,
several authors have argued that exclusive licensing agreements may be
tantamount to a sale since Pfaff and Group One were decided.
An exclusive licensing agreement is defined as a "license that gives the
licensee the exclusive right to perform the licensed act and that prohibits
the licensor from granting the right to anyone else."' 7 4 An assignment is
"the transfer of rights or property."'7 While exclusive licenses and
assignments are viewed as a licenses by the courts, what distinguishes
exclusive licenses and assignments from sales? If a property owner has
granted all of his rights to a licensee for an indefinite period of time,
should this transaction not be viewed as a sale and not as a license?
According to Judge Lourie's reasoning, even under the extreme Group
One circumstances mentioned above an assignment or exclusive license
is rarely viewed as a sale.' 76
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However if someone challenges a licensing agreement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) to deny patentability of an invention, several defenses still exist.
First, an inventor may argue that their licensing agreement constitutes a
joint development exception which preserves patentability.' Although
many attorneys and researchers believe there is a joint development
exception to the on-sale bar rule, an examination of the case law reveals
that this exception does not exist. Furthermore, the U.S. Federal Circuit
explicitly noted in Buildex Inc. v. Kason Industries Inc. that it has never
recognized ajoint development exception. 78 Therefore this exception does
not exist and is not viable.
Second, the experimental use exception may be applied to any
licensing agreement and specifically to the instant facts. This exception
would preserve patentability until a viable use is found for the previously
discussed genetic material. The experimental use of an invention is a
judicially recognized exception that overcomes the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) onsale bar and public use bar.'79 The Court articulated this concept in City of
Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated the use of an invention by the inventor himself via experimentation
in order to bring the invention to perfection has never been regarded as a
sale under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).lS° Therefore, the primary question posed by
the experimental use doctrine is whether the main purpose of the inventor
at the time of transaction was to conduct experimentation.
When applying the rule set forth in City ofElizabeth, several objective
factors are often considered.' These objective factors may include the
length of the test period, whether payment was made for the device,
whether there was a confidentiality agreement, whether progress reports
were kept, the overall number of tests and the amount of control retained
over the operation." 2 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has held that once an invention has been reduced to practice, sales
of the invention cannot fall within the experimental exception even if such

177. See Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 671, 681-82 n.4 (E.D.
Mich. 1979).
178. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
179. Imi-Tech Corp. v. Gagliani, 691 F. Supp. 214, 233-34 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
180. See generally City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-35
(1877).
181. See id.at 135.
182. See id.
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sales are for experimental purpose because this activity would render the
patent invalid.'83
Furthermore, Pharmacia,Inc. v. Frigitronics,Inc., held that sales of
hyaluronic acid by an inventor before the critical date for the purposes of
experimentation did not make the inventor's subsequent patent for
ultrapure, noninflammatory hyaluronic acid invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b). 84 The district court ruled that prior to the critical date, the inventor
was still conducting experiments to determine whether the hyaluronic acid
was satisfactorily noninflammatory, and thus at that time he did not have
the actual invention to sell.'85
The district court explained that the inventor did not have the resources
needed for the extensive testing, so he solicited the help of the purchaser,
but the inventor retained a measure of control over the purchaser's
experiments. 186 The district court added that: the inventor sold the
chemical at a "production cost"; there was a secrecy provision in the
contract; and many of the letters between the inventor and purchaser
referred to "clinical trials,.... tests," and "experiments." ' 7 The district court
conceded that a footnote in one article stated that the hyaluronic acid was
available commercially, but the district court concluded that this term was
used to mean that samples were available for a modest fee rather than free,
and the term was not used in the sense of "for profit" or in the sense that
the term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 8 ' The district court rejected the
argument that the term "nonrestricted chemical" found on some invoices
demonstrated that the sales were unrestricted commercial sales; instead it
meant that the chemical was not restricted for export purposes. 89
The Pharmaciacourt noted that the inventor "sold" the invention at
production cost, maintained some level of control over the invention, and
exchanged many
letters entitled "clinical tests,". "trials," and
"experiments."' 90 Although the inventor's actions preserved patentability
in this case, a thorough examination of the case law has revealed that
patentability may be lost unknowingly if one enters into a licensing

183. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056,1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also
At. Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
184. Pharmacia, Inc. v. Frigitronics, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 876, 887-88 (D. Mass. 1989).
185. See id. at 887.
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188. Id.
189. Pharmacia,726 F. Supp. at 887-88.
190. Id. at 887.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW& POLICY

[Vol. I I

agreement that is subsequently deemed to be a commercial offer for
sale. 9 ' In Pharmacia,the inventor supposedly maintained control and
further research was conducted. 192
In Group One, Judge Lourie notes in concurrence that
A license under a patent is not usually a sale of the patented
product, and the statute bars a sale, not a license. A license is
analogous to granting or waiving rights under the patent, which is
distinct from selling the machine covered by the patent. A patent
license, if it is non-exclusive, is an agreement to forbear from suit.
If the license is exclusive, it may be tantamount to an assignment of
of the patent necessarily
the patent. In neither case is the invention
93
executed.
is
license
the
when
on-sale
Although Judge Lourie and numerous other judges propagate the idea that
an exclusive or non-exclusive license does not constitute a sale, the Kock
court clearly disagrees. In Kock, the language of the contract states, "The
INVENTOR hereby sells, assigns and transfers all rights to his novelty toy
watch movement and any invention embodied therein to the (Merry)
COMPANY."194 Using Judge Lourie's reasoning in Hallmark, this
language unequivocally declares the inventor is assigning his rights or
granting an exclusive license agreement. Even though ample evidence
exists showing Merry Manufacturing Company conducted test on the
to invalidate Kock's patent
product upon receipt, the Kock court proceeds
95
on-sale.
be
to
deemed
was
it
because
These two differing opinions demonstrate the conflicts and ambiguities
presented in determining whether a transaction is a sale or a license.
Furthermore, if an ambiguity exists in the agreement between two
contracting parties, the Pharmaciacourt will often look to the control
maintained by the inventor. 96 If a court deems that the inventor has
maintained an adequate amount of control, the invention's patentability

191. See, e.g., Kock v. Quaker Oats, 681 F.2d 649, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1982) (Pregerson, J.,
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will be maintained under the experimental exception. The Pharmaciacourt
said that the inventor retained control of his invention at all times and
further research as noted by the research documents exchanged between
the two parties. 197 While this conclusion is reasonable, the Pharmacia
court makes the inventor's receipt of royalties for use of this product and
the inventor's use of the phrase "commercially available" secondary
issues. However, evaluated under the Kock court's more stringent
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), these claims should not be patentable
if the application for patent is filed after the critical date.
V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of the patent system is to "promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and [the] useful [a]rts."' 9 Exclusive and non-exclusive licensing
agreements serve this purpose. However, if uncertainty exists as to what
constitutes a sale, inventors will not disclose their products, processes, or
methods until the invention has been reduced to practice and a patent
application has been filed. With this uncertainty existing in the law, the
rapidly growing field of biotechnology will especially suffer because of
scientist's apprehension in sharing their potential inventions before
receiving a patent. Therefore, tests and rules need to be proposed that
clearly state whether licensing agreements constitute sales.
Previous authors have acknowledged the competing interest of
licensing and the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) on-sale bar. However, their solutions
were radically different than the solution presented below.'99 One author
stated that licenses should not be exempt from the on-sale bar but
assignments should be exempt from this on-sale bar.2"' This proposal is
both illogical and nonsensical; assignments are more similar to sales than
non-exclusive or exclusive licenses. Thus 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) should
regulate assignments before ever regulating licensing agreements.
Additionally, the previously mentioned author's primary concern revolved
around patent misuse, and the author proposed a drastic measure which

197. Id.
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
199. See, e.g., Frank Albert, Reformulating the On Sale Bar,28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
81, 104-06 (2005); Roderick M. Thompson, The LicensingException to the On-Sale Bar:A Wrong
Turn on the Path To Predictability,45 IDEA 35, 75 (2004).
200. Thompson, supra note 199, at 72-75.
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called for a major overhaul of the current licensing system.2 ' Using this
proposal, the licensing system for all intensive purposes would be
eradicated. However, there is no need to re-invent the proverbial licensing
wheel. The primary need is to repair what is currently broken-the
distinction between licenses and sales. Furthermore, current laws and the
adoption of new rules can easily govern patent misuse thus limiting an
inventor's potentially egregious conduct of trying to extend the life of their
patent. If the previously mentioned author's ideas were adopted,
promotion of the sciences and useful arts would be hindered. Therefore,
this previously proposed solution runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution.2 2
The current ambiguities between commercial sales and licensing may
be clarified by adopting the following rules. First, the court should adopt
a bright line rule that states "Any time there is a clear intent to license an
invention, this transaction will be deemed a license." Clear intent may be
demonstrated by simply (1) labeling the agreement "Exclusive" or "Nonexclusive" licensing agreement. To prevent further ambiguity, the license
should (2) contain provisions stating that the licensor retains exclusive title
to the invention. This provision clearly states that ownership is maintained
by the licensor while the licensee has a right to practice the invention.
Next, the license should have a provision in which (3) the licensor retains
the right to sue any infringer. Finally, the agreement between the licensee
and licensor should state (4) an initiation and termination date, but renewal
provisions may be included in the agreement. If these provisions are
included in an agreement and subsequently abided by both parties, the
agreement demonstrates control by the inventor and a clear intention to
license the invention, and not to sale the invention. However, if provisions
such as the ones mentioned above are omitted, the court should adopt a
policy that the agreement is not a license thus deeming the agreement a
sale.
A second bright line rule stating "A license agreement never constitutes
a sale" should be adopted. Many judges and courts have adopted this rule
and ideology that a license agreement does not constitute a sale. However,
a thorough examination of the case law provides no uniformity or
precedent for this view.20 3 If this second rule is adopted, a licensor will
never need to worry about loss of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)

201. See id. at 75.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
203. See, e.g., Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1052-53 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (Lourie, J., concurring).
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unless the licensee actually places the licensed invention on-sale.
However, this potential problem can be contractually limited by
restrictions in the licensing agreement as stated above. If the licensing
agreement is breached, the inventor will have a breach of contract remedy
and a possible remedy for injunctive relief. Furthermore, the inventor's
invention should still maintain patentability. If the licensee breached the
contract and sold the invention without the inventor's knowledge before
the critical date, the inventor should be allowed to file for and receive a
patent. To allow a licensee to ruin an invention's patentability, due to the
licensee's indiscretions, is illogical and could deter licensing altogether.
If licensing is deterred, scientific progression will be stymied. Thus, the
current policy, which allows a licensee's activities to potentially bar the
inventor's patent rights, runs counter to the U.S. Constitution's reasons for
conceiving a patent system.
Third, the current experimental use analysis should be incorporated into
this proposed analysis. When construing experimental use, the following
issues should be considered: (1) what the license agreement actually states
(i.e., was a confidentiality agreement present in the license) (2) the amount
of control the inventor had over his invention once it was licensed; (3)
whether tests were conducted by the licensee; (4) if the licensee conducted
tests were the results discussed with the licensor; and (5) did the licensor
or licensee pursue a commercial sale as defined by the UCC and Pfaf? By
applying this analysis, the distinction between a sale and a license can be
further delineated.
In conclusion, these proposed rules and tests provide much needed
uniformity and continuity in the areas of licensing and the 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) statute. By overturning current case law, this test provides added
relief for a licensee's indiscretions that may bar an inventor's patent rights
due to a sale. This test, which endorses preservation of patentability while
promoting the inventor to license their discovery, provides clear guidelines
for inventors in the area of unpatented inventions. Therefore, by providing
uniformity and clarity by differentiating licenses and sales, this new test
and policy would promote "the progress of science and [the] useful arts,"
the very foundation the patent system is built on.2°
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